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THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN ELECTION LAW

The role of judges in election law is both important and controversial. Discussion about the appropriate role of judicial activism arises in many areas, but election law raises particular concerns going to
the heart of the democratic process. In Judicial Activism and Passivism
in Election Law, Professor Dan Tokaji argues that the judicial default
should be passivism, but when minority rights are at stake or those in
power seek to entrench themselves, judicial activism is warranted and
necessary. Professor Tokaji evaluates three recent cases in which the
Supreme Court tackled election law and campaign finance—Bush v.
Gore, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, and Citizens United v.
FEC. He argues that in Bush v. Gore, the Court appropriately intervened where both minority rights and the potential for entrenchment
were involved. The later two cases, however, failed to strike the appropriate balance: the Court in Crawford neglected to act where it
was necessary to prevent entrenchment, and in Citizens United, intervened in a way that undermined legislation intended to bring about
equality. The Roberts Court, concludes Tokaji, lacks a coherent constitutional theory of judicial activism, at least in matters of election
law. Allison Hayward, in Judging Politics in a Federalist System, responds
that Tokaji’s definition of “election law” need not have a coherent
constitutional theory because it is not a discrete area of law. Hayward
suggests that deference is warranted when a branch of government
acts within its constitutionally prescribed limits; when it does not, the
courts need not defer. Hayward distinguishes Bush v. Gore and Crawford on a basis of consistent application of the standard at issue, going
on to argue that equal protection does not have a place in either case;
thus the Court appropriately deferred to the legislative branch. Citizens United, however she concludes, is a free speech case rather than
an election law case, and deserves strict scrutiny.
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Judicial Activism and Passivism in Election Law
Daniel P. Tokaji
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One of the few things that unites politicians across the political
spectrum is a penchant for complaining about judicial activism. The
trouble is that they don’t agree on what it is or when it is appropriate.
For decades, conservatives have complained of activism when it comes
to constitutional decisions regarding desegregation, criminal procedure, abortion, and gay rights. In recent years, liberals have become
increasingly concerned about judicial activism by the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts in striking down key parts of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, Violence Against Women Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, and other federal laws.
Some fear that health care reform or section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act will be the next to fall.
To issue a blanket condemnation of judicial activism is, of course,
too simplistic. The challenge lies in articulating a principled basis for
assessing what counts as “good” and “bad” activism. It is fine and
proper to insist on fidelity to the text of the Constitution. But openended terms like “equal protection,” “due process,” and “the freedom
of speech” will not interpret themselves. Their application instead
demands a coherent theory that identifies the proper role of an independent and largely unaccountable judiciary in our democracy. Otherwise, constitutional law will appear to many citizens as—and may in
fact be—nothing more than politics by another name.
Nowhere is this challenge more prominent and pressing than in
the field of election law, as exemplified by three prominent cases:
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), and Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010). To many observers, including some legal scholars, these cases
have the flavor of U.S. Supreme Court Justices indulging their own
political preferences in the form of intractable constitutional law.
This Opening Statement considers what sort of analysis courts should
apply when it comes to election administration and campaign finance,
two topics that have received a great deal of public and scholarly attention in recent years. Using these cases as illustrative, I attempt to define
†
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when judicial activism is warranted—and when “passivism” is more appropriate—when dealing with the regulation of democratic politics.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
It is a point of common agreement that if judges are to undo the
handiwork of elected officials, then they ought to have very good reasons for doing so. That is, courts should generally defer to the preferences of the citizenry as expressed through their elected representatives at the federal, state, and local levels.
This general principle applies to election law as well as to other
fields. There are, after all, multiple values at play in the regulation of
the political process, including liberty, equality, integrity, transparency, and competitiveness. When those values collide, as they sometimes
do, people of goodwill may disagree over which to prioritize. In addition, disagreements sometimes occur over the real-world impact of a
particular practice. Take, for example, the debate over voter identification, where Democrats and Republicans tend to divide not only on
whether to emphasize the value of access or integrity, but also on the
effects of such policies. It is generally the job of elected officials—not
unelected judges—to resolve factual disagreements and to reconcile
competing values. Thus, passivism, not activism, should be the norm in
judicial decisionmaking.
On the other hand, courts sometimes are justified in according
less deference to rules structuring the political process. There are two
main justifications for distrusting political actors and, accordingly, for
close judicial scrutiny of some election laws and practices.
The first is the risk that a majority will seek to weaken a minority
of citizens by excluding them from full participation. The most obvious example is the systematic exclusion of African Americans from
Southern politics through most of the twentieth century. The Court’s
decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), is
an example of judicial activism in this area that almost everyone now
considers justified. In Harper, the Court struck down a $1.50 poll tax
as a violation of equal protection. Harper did not expressly rely on the
racially discriminatory character of the poll tax, but instead relied on
the likelihood that the tax would inhibit participation of economically
disadvantaged voters. Id. at 668. This type of rationale for intervention may be thought of as minority protection, in the sense that such
intervention protects a minority of citizens from an exclusionary practice that the majority favors.
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The other main reason for judicial intervention in elections is the
risk that elected officials will promote their own self-interest at the expense of the polity. As Justice Scalia has put it, “The first instinct of
power is the retention of power.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Incumbent officeholders may adopt self-entrenching measures that make it
difficult for voters to remove them from office. Alternatively, they
may seek to hold on to power through inaction—that is, through
measures that leave in place electoral rules that prevent challengers
from competing and that frustrate the will of the minority. This rationale might thus be thought of as a form of majority protection, in
the sense that it prevents elected officials from serving their own interests at the expense of the citizenry.
A prominent example of entrenchment through inaction is the
egregious malapportionment of state legislative bodies that had developed by the mid-twentieth century. Before the articulation of the
“one person, one vote” rule in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558
(1964), state legislatures were under no constitutional mandate to redraw legislative districts after each decennial census. In many states,
redistricting had not occurred for decades. As a result, the most populous legislative district often had a population that was many times
the size of the least populous. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545. The consequence was severe underrepresentation of voters in more heavily
populated urban districts and effective minority rule by voters in less
populated rural districts. In Alabama, for example, 25.1% of the
state’s population resided in districts that controlled a majority of
state senate seats. Id. Of course, incumbent legislators who benefited
from this system of unequal representation had no incentive to
change it. Judicial intervention was necessary, and ultimately came
through Reynolds’s articulation of the “one person, one vote” principle
requiring that legislative districts be equally populated.
This does not, of course, mean that every law that arguably burdens minority participation or promotes incumbent self-interest
should be struck down. The baseline presumption should still be that
elected officials get to decide how best to promote the sometimes
competing values in our democracy. But the decisions of elected officials are less trustworthy—and the argument for searching judicial review is accordingly stronger—when there is evidence that an electoral
practice will impair participation by a political minority or serve the
interests of those in power.
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II. BUSH V. GORE: LOOKING BETTER WITH AGE
In assessing judicial activism in the realm of election law, it is useful to examine some of the Supreme Court’s most controversial decisions of recent years with these justifications for judicial intervention
in mind. Viewed in this light, Bush v. Gore looks better now than it did
to most commentators at the time it was decided.
The majority in Bush concluded that the “arbitrary and disparate
treatment” of voters in Florida’s 2000 recount denied those voters
equal protection. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-11. The Court cited just four
equal protection cases: Harper, Reynolds, and two other “one person,
one vote” cases—Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), and Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). The problem with Florida’s recount, according to the majority, was the lack of clear rules for determining
which ballots should count. 531 U.S. at 106. Reading between the
lines, the Court was concerned with the discretion that state law gave
to local officials and state judges, which would allow those state officials and judges to manipulate the rules to benefit their preferred
candidate. See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On
Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2488-90
(2003). Put another way, the lack of a sufficiently clear standard
threatened to result in the unfair exclusion of some voters and in
skewed election results.
In this sense, Bush v. Gore may be understood as marrying Harper’s
concern with exclusion and Reynolds’s concern with entrenchment.
To be more precise, the Court’s holding rests on a fear that state officials will abuse their discretion in a way that would unfairly prevent
some voters from participating in the election. There is no doubt that
Bush v. Gore was an activist decision in that it reached beyond existing
precedent to hold a state’s method of recounting votes unconstitutional. But it is a decision whose activism—at least with regard to its
equal protection holding—may be justified by the need to prevent inequality and rein in official discretion.
This assessment is not to deny that there are good reasons for criticizing Bush v. Gore. The Court did a poor job explaining its reasoning and failed to specify the level of scrutiny it applied. It explicitly
left open the boundaries of the equal protection principle upon
which it relied, although this is not all that unusual for a decision that
breaks new constitutional ground. Most problematic was the remedy
the Court ordered, which called for an end to the recount, rather
than an instruction that the Florida Supreme Court should decide
whether to continue the recount under a clearer standard. 531 U.S.
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at 110-11. With these qualifications, the equal protection reasoning of
Bush v. Gore looks better with a decade of hindsight than it did to
many at the time.
The Court deserves greater criticism for what has happened since
2000. It has avoided Bush v. Gore like the plague, refusing to cite it in
any decision since then—including equal protection cases implicating
equality of participation. See Chad Flanders, Please Don’t Cite This Case!
The Precedential Value of Bush v. Gore, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141,
144 (2006), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/75.pdf. The
Court has done nothing to clarify the equal protection principle that
it relied upon in Bush v. Gore but instead, as explained below, has actually muddied the waters further. It has treated Bush v. Gore as an embarrassment. The real embarrassment, however, is the Court’s avoidance
of the decision, which suggests that majority Justices have been unwilling to abide by the principle that they relied upon in that case.
III. CRAWFORD: FAILING TO PROTECT PARTICIPATION
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board is the most important election administration decision since 2000—and the one in which the
Court most conspicuously failed to cite Bush v. Gore or wrestle with its
implications. In Crawford, the Court upheld Indiana’s law—enacted
by a party-line vote, 553 U.S. at 203 n.21—which required most voters
to present government-issued photo identification in order to have
their votes counted. Id. at 185-86. Although no opinion commanded
a majority, five Justices endorsed a sliding-scale test for evaluating barriers to participation. 553 U.S. at 189-90 (Stevens, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J. and Kennedy, J.); id. at 210 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). Under this standard, the strength of the government’s
interest varies depending on the severity of the burden that the challenged electoral practice imposes. For example, if voters were able to
show that a registration requirement discriminates against a class of
voters, or that it imposes a “severe” burden on their right to vote, then
the state would have to show that this burden is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest. Id. at 190. On the other hand, if an electoral practice is “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory,” then a more
relaxed level of scrutiny applies. Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
The obvious problem with this generic standard is that it provides
little guidance in resolving hard cases, particularly ones where the
evidence is scant or conflicting. Crawford itself is a prime example.
On the record before the Court, there was little evidence to show that
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the law would seriously burden any individual voters or group of voters. At the same time, Indiana produced no evidence showing any serious problem with voter fraud that would require implementation of
a voter identification law. The state was unable to document even one
instance of in-person voter impersonation—the only type of misconduct that the law would prevent. Id. at 194.
Given the paucity of evidence, it should come as little surprise that
the Justices who applied essentially the same standard came to different conclusions. The lead opinion by Justice Stevens found the state’s
mostly hypothetical concerns sufficient to uphold the law, while the
dissenting Justices found the burden to be unjustified by the state’s
proffered interests. Given the vagueness of the legal standards applied,
it is easy to see how different Justices reached different conclusions.
The main problem with Crawford is the majority Justices’ failure to
reckon with the consequences of Harper. Recall that the Harper Court
struck down a poll tax that had a tendency to exclude economically
disadvantaged voters, and in doing so, applied a standard that we
would now refer to as strict scrutiny. 383 U.S. at 670 (holding that
rules infringing on fundamental rights must be “closely scrutinized
and carefully confined”). The Court did so even without finding statistical evidence of a disparate impact on any particular group of voters, much less intentional discrimination toward any group. The
Court’s rationale was that the poll tax’s burden weighed especially
heavily on economically disadvantaged voters and therefore denied
“the opportunity for equal participation by all voters.” Id. (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566).
By the same token, there was evidence in Crawford that certain
groups of voters were more likely to lack government-issued photo
identification. Those groups included poor, elderly, disabled, and
homeless voters. 553 U.S. at 199 (plurality); id. at 212 n.4, 216 (Souter, J., dissenting). That evidence should have been enough to place a
heavier burden of justification on the state, especially given the partyline vote by which Indiana’s law was enacted. The absence of any evidence of in-person voting fraud—the only illegality that the law purported to prevent—suggests that the real motivation was the Republican majority’s desire to make it more difficult for Democratic-leaning
voters to participate. The constitutional argument against Indiana’s law
thus recalls the entrenchment concerns that led the Court to intervene
in Reynolds and in other “one person, one vote” cases. In these cases,
the concern is that a legislative majority is acting to entrench itself.
Crawford was therefore a case in which the Court was unduly passivist. Given the danger that it would deny equal participation and the
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“danger signs” tending to show partisan motivation, the Court should
have applied heightened scrutiny. See Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 359 (2007). Had the Court applied such
a test, there would have been no serious doubt as to the law’s unconstitutionality, given the state’s failure to produce any evidence that it would
stop illegal voting.
IV. CITIZENS UNITED: DENYING EQUALITY
While the Court has been too passive when dealing with barriers
to voter participation, it has been overly aggressive when dealing with
the regulation of campaign finance. The most controversial example
in recent years is the decision in Citizens United, in which the Court
struck down a key component of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA). Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917. Citizens United’s conclusion
that corporate expenditures on elections are a form of speech that the
First Amendment protects has generated the most criticism. But the
real problem with Citizens United is its rejection of political equality as
a countervailing democratic value that may sometimes justify limits on
campaign spending.
Citizens United struck down the BCRA’s prohibition on corporations funding “electioneering” expenditures from their treasuries. Id.
at 886. The majority opinion subjected the law to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment after finding that the law imposed a burden on
corporate speech. Id. at 898. This part of the Court’s holding broke
no new ground. There are, moreover, good reasons for applying a
heightened level of scrutiny to laws that impede election-related expression. When incumbent legislators act to impose limits on political
spending, they may be acting to promote their own interests in reelection—for example, by making it more difficult for challengers to
compete. Of course, legislators may also promote their own interest
by failing to enact limits on campaign spending, since the status quo
may well inure to the advantage of incumbents. Still, it is at least
possible that limits on campaign spending may impede competition,
and therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to apply some form of
heightened scrutiny.
The real significance of Citizens United is its rejection of political
equality as a justification for imposing limits on campaign spending.
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court allowed restrictions on corporate expenditures based on the state interest in curbing
“the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
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wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form.”
494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990). This reasoning was an equality rationale;
it was designed to promote the ideal of equality in the realm of democratic politics. Citizens United, however, overruled Austin, taking equality as a justification for limits on corporate expenditures off the table.
Citizens United also rejected the argument that the interest in preventing
corruption of the electoral process could justify a ban on corporate
electioneering. Whether corporations have unequal access to the political process and unequal influence on its outputs was beside the point,
from the Court’s perspective, because only the reality or appearance of
quid pro quo corruption can justify spending limits. Id. at 910-11.
Citizens United’s holding is consistent with the main thrust of Supreme Court precedent over the past four decades, which has mostly
rejected equality as a justification for campaign finance regulation.
The most notable example before Citizens United was Buckley v. Valeo,
which held that the “concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” 424 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1976). The problem with this line of precedent is that it usurps the
role of legislative bodies in determining how best to balance the various competing values at play in our democracy. There is no doubt
that money is essential to effective speech in the context of political
campaigns. The corollary of this proposition is that those without significant financial resources lack the capacity for effective speech. In a
system of unlimited spending, there is a pronounced risk that the
speech of the “have-a-lots” will overwhelm the speech of the “havenots.” This is anathema to a society that is committed to the principle
of “one person, one vote.” See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law (and Why the Canadian
Approach Is Superior), (The Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 140, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1746868
(providing a more detailed explanation of Citizens United’s overruling
of the Austin antidistortion rationale).
To be sure, citizens may have legitimate disagreements as to
whether the value of political equality should outweigh other values,
such as liberty. The problem with Citizens United is that it entirely removes equality from the conversation. After Citizens United, legislative
bodies may not even consider political equality as a justification for
limits on political spending. If they do, any limits they impose are
sure to be struck down. For this reason, Citizens United represents unjustified activism. In prohibiting legislative bodies from even considering

282

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

[Vol. 159: 273

equality as a justification for campaign finance regulation, the Court arrogates to itself the power to determine the democratic values that our
electoral system may serve. The interest in preventing voter exclusion
or in preventing incumbent entrenchment cannot justify its activism.
CONCLUSION
Some of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions in recent
years have involved constitutional challenges to election laws. The
strong political valence of these cases tends to induce accusations that
the Court is engaging in judicial activism. The real challenge, however, is to articulate a coherent basis for when activism is and is not
appropriate in the regulation of the political process.
This Opening Statement has identified two justifications for unelected judges’ supplanting elected officials’ judgment in electoral
process decisions: the protection of minorities and the prevention of
self-interested behavior by those in power. Judged by these criteria,
Bush v. Gore’s equal protection holding may be understood as justifiable activism. The Court’s more recent decisions in Crawford and Citizens United do not stand up as well—though for very different reasons.
Crawford was too passivist, failing to closely scrutinize an election rule
that burdened certain voters while benefiting the majority party. By
contrast, the Court in Citizens United exhibited an inappropriate degree of activism, taking equality off the table as a justification for limits
on campaign spending.
Those who disagree with this assessment have the burden of articulating a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation under
which the Court’s activism in Citizens United—as well as its passivism in
Crawford—may be justified. So far, the Roberts Court has failed miserably at this task.
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REBUTTAL
Judging Politics in a Federalist System
Allison R. Hayward

†

I want to respond to Professor Tokaji’s Opening Statement first by
saying something about election law as a discrete legal area. Deeming
“election law” a field of study is somewhat like deeming the former
Yugoslavia a country. You can draw a line around almost anything,
but if the interior lacks unifying features or principles, the exercise
may not yield anything useful. Indeed, if you group unlike things together and expect them to cohere when they should not, spurious
discord results. This is the problem that occurs when Professor Tokaji—and many others—demand a “coherent” constitutional theory to
explain election law holdings. In this Rebuttal, I will discuss the same
three cases Professor Tokaji discussed—Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)—because they exemplify
the problem I am trying to describe.
Constitutional adjudication, the context in which judges (and particularly Supreme Court Justices) are often tarred as “activists,” involves two major considerations. Professor Tokaji focuses on the protection of individual rights, as set forth in the amendments to the
Constitution. But the Constitution also sets forth a structure. It describes three branches of the federal government and a division of labor between federal and state governments, which is defined by the
Constitutional limits on federal power. When state and federal governments operate within the Constitution’s limits, the choices of those
governments deserve the courts’ deference. If they do not operate
therein, then no deference is warranted.
The Constitution specifies a few places where only the states, and
not the federal government, should operate. One of those areas is
specified in Article I, Section 4, which declares, “The Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4,
cl. 1. A case like Crawford implicates this state power.
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I agree with Professor Tokaji’s description of the posture of Crawford. In retrospect, the litigants might have done better to allow a
record of effects to mature and to instead bring an as-applied challenge, claiming that the law created an unconstitutional burden on
voting. As it was, the Court heard a case where there was little evidence of injury or efficacy—which contrasts with the position the
Court was in when it considered the poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Given Crawford’s posture, the Court
reasonably concluded that the state’s voter identification law deserved
deference against this facial challenge. When litigants challenge election-administration laws, they run up against the constitutional text
that grants authority over election administration to the states. In
such cases, the Court has dealt with the competing rights of states and
voters by constructing a balancing test, which is suboptimal if one prioritzes clarity and predictability. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see also Bryan P.
Jensen, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: The Missed Opportunity to Remedy the Ambiguity and Unpredictability of Burdick, 86 DENV.
U. L. REV. 535 (2009).
The Court considered the frontiers of state discretion in Bush v.
Gore. Generally, Florida’s administrators, lawmakers, and courts should
deal with the counting of citizens’ ballots under Article I, Section 4. Yet
while states may have the power to regulate elections, they cannot impose arbitrary and inconsistent election-administration procedures.
They cannot be lawless. The Court’s remedy in Bush v. Gore still sticks
in the craw of many people, and I understand why this is so. However,
the Court’s majority preferred finality, which I can also understand.
Opponents of the Indiana voter identification law in Crawford
might argue that the state’s voter identification law is ineffective at
reaching the more likely instances of voter fraud. As an initial matter,
I think there is a distinction to be drawn between a state voting regulation that is marginally effective but applied consistently over the state
and standardless ballot-counting that leads to inconsistencies within
the state. But even if there isn’t a distinction, election-administration
doctrine and standards of review allow for state discretion in situations
where Congress, in its infinite wisdom, has left the issue to the states’
authority. Were Congress to step in and impose a national voter identification requirement (or a national standard for assessing dimpled
chads, or a national felon-voting standard), then that law would also
be assessed under the more deferential standards applied to electionadministration rules and regulations. Of course, there is a place for
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an equal protection claim—when the antecedent discriminatory intent and impact are apparent. But that is not the case in Bush v. Gore
or Crawford.
Not that constitutional litigators need my advice, but I think that a
strategy of pursuing voter identification cases with Harper as the leading case will not work. It seems that courts would find a voter identification law unconstitutional in one of two situations. First, the law
would fail in a situation where the litigants can show both a disparate
impact on a protected minority group and the intent to discriminate
against that group. This is the classic equal protection formulation a
lawyer would argue in challenging any kind of governmental act.
Second, the litigants could, in the right situation, classify the voter
identification law as arbitrary, ineffective, and counterproductive,
such that the state’s use of it cannot be justified as applied to specific
cohorts of voters—even when the burden on voters is modest. Today,
the Court and federal circuits are not going to find a “wealth discrimination” Harper-esque argument convincing. We may not all be Keynesians anymore, but we all are, for now at least, capitalists. See Ike
Brannon, We Were All Keynesians Then, CATO INST. (Jan. 9, 2006),
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5362.
All of this says nothing about how campaign regulations should be
evaluated.
Campaign finance restrictions are not electionadministration laws. They are content-based restrictions on speech
and association. Campaigns and elections are both political, but they
are not the same thing. There is no constitutionally directed state authority at issue. It does not make sense to lump them into some “election law” classification that includes election-administration cases, ethics
and lobbying rules, and redistricting, among other things. Accordingly,
“judicial activism” should not be evaluated in the same way.
The holding of Citizens United, that the federal ban on independent expenditures and electioneering communications is unconstitutional, must be correct. 130 S. Ct. at 886. There is no characteristic
uniting all corporations that justifies a uniform, outright federal ban.
Could wealth be one such characteristic? Not all corporations have
wealth—and many other entities in society are wealthy yet are not subject to the expenditure ban. And no, it doesn’t matter that corporations aren’t “real people.” The freedom of speech and assembly under the Constitution protects the rights of speakers to speak and of
listeners to hear a message. There may be messages that aren’t protected—obscenity and libel, for example—but any source of a message
gets to speak. Imagine the situation if this weren’t true: a Republican
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Congress could selectively silence public employee unions, or governmental incumbents could impose content-based restrictions indirectly.
If the Supreme Court had been a more straightforward activist in
its approach to First Amendment cases in 1957, we wouldn’t be having
the argument over the holding in Citizens United today. See United
States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); Allison R. Hayward, Revisiting
the Fable of Reform, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 421 (2008). In UAW-CIO, the
Court was presented with a labor union’s constitutional challenge to
the campaign expenditure ban. Id. at 568 (describing the ban under
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952)). The leading legal thinkers of the time
thought the ban was unconstitutional. See Hayward, supra, at 460-61.
The Court was unduly passive, and after holding that the union’s expenditures constituted a violation of the expenditure ban, it then remanded the case. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 589-93. The Court thus
avoided the constitutional question. The ban’s constitutionality had
to be assessed eventually, and it is stunning (and unfortunate) that it
took until 2010 to resolve this question.
In short, Professor Tokaji has drawn a line around three cases and
found them inconsistent. I would draw a line around only two, Bush v.
Gore and Crawford, and conclude that they are consistent. Citizens United is simply a different creature—it’s a speech case, not an elections case.
Speech cases involving content-based restrictions deserve strict scrutiny;
elections cases are judged by something more deferential. To me, it isn’t
any more complicated than that.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Electoral Equality: Why Campaign Finance Isn’t So Special
Daniel P. Tokaji
In her inimitably engaging and enlightening style, Allison Hayward tries to draw a bright line between the two domains of election
law discussed in my Opening Statement: election administration and
campaign finance. She defends the Court’s holding in Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), on the ground that “it’s a speech case,
not an elections case.” Because restrictions on speech are usually subject to strict scrutiny, she argues, the Court was correct in striking
down the prohibition on corporate electioneering in Citizens United.
By contrast, burdens on voting, including ones that bear disproportionately on economically disadvantaged citizens, are generally subject
to a more deferential review.
Hayward provides a fair description of current doctrine. But my
main point is that this doctrine is defective—more precisely, this doctrine is not justified by a coherent conception of the proper role of
courts in a democracy. By way of reply, I will explain my underlying concern with the Court’s approach to the regulation of elections, focusing
mostly on campaign finance, the topic on which we most sharply diverge.
Let me return to the premise of my argument. Principled judicial
activism demands a reconciliation of the Court’s stringent approach
to burdens on campaign spending with its generally tolerant approach
to burdens on voting. Hayward’s key move—the first of two I contest
here—is to isolate campaign finance because it involves speech, not
elections.
It is certainly true that campaign finance involves
speech . . . but it also involves elections. Proponents of campaign
finance regulation are concerned about the effect that vast inequalities in financial resources will have on election results and on the decisions elected officials make once in office.
More importantly, the characterization of campaign spending as
speech—or at least “speechy,” as Professor Richard Briffault has put
it—does not end the constitutional conversation, but only begins it.
See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118,
119 n.3 (2010) (explaining the origin of Briffault’s phrase). The term
“freedom of speech,” like “equal protection of the laws,” is not selfdefining. It demands interpretation, both with regard to the level of
protection that different forms of expression receive and the countervailing justifications that may warrant regulation. Although the United
States provides broader protection for speech than other democracies,
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the Supreme Court has never embraced the free speech absolutism
most famously espoused by Justices Black and Douglas. Some categories of speech—such as obscenity and fighting words—receive no protection at all. Others—such as commercial speech and campaign contributions—are reviewed under less than strict scrutiny. These different
levels of scrutiny reflect judgments about both the value of the speech
in question and countervailing values that warrant regulation.
As First Amendment doctrine developed in the twentieth century,
the Court recognized a number of countervailing values that may
sometimes justify limits on speech, even protected speech. These values include some indisputably important ones, such as the prevention
of imminent violence, threats to national security, and corruption; the
Court has also recognized countervailing interests that are less weighty,
1
such as the protection of public morals and even aesthetics. My point
here is not to argue for or against any of these decisions or the interests
they recognize. Rather, the point is that our First Amendment tradition
recognizes that speech must sometimes give way to other values.
The main problem with the Supreme Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence is the Court’s rejection of political equality as a countervailing value. Hayward claims that the Court’s holding in Citizens United, striking down the federal prohibition on corporate electioneering,
“must be correct.” But this is only true if one agrees that the Court
was right in taking equality off the table as a value that may sometimes
justify restrictions on campaign spending.
The Court’s holding in Citizens United does not just create a conflict between free speech and equal protection. It also creates a conflict within the First Amendment. For if one accepts the proposition
that money facilitates election-related speech, then it follows that
those without resources effectively lack speech—or, more precisely,
lack the ability to be heard in the electoral marketplace. As Kathleen
Sullivan has recently observed, there is both a libertarian strain and an
egalitarian strain to our First Amendment tradition. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145
(2010). In the context of campaign finance regulation, these two
strains are in direct conflict.

1

See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (national security); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (aesthetics); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (corruption); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (public morals); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(imminent violence).
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What justifies the Court’s rejection of equality as a justification for
campaign finance regulation? The best answer that deregulationists
can offer is that limits on campaign spending may lead to the entrenchment of incumbents. This is partially true. As Justice Scalia has put
it, the “first instinct of power is the retention of power.” McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Some regulatory schemes may well have the effect of
helping incumbents and hurting challengers. But not all regulations
will have that effect. To the contrary, a completely unregulated political marketplace may be to the greatest advantage of incumbent officeholders—after all, the smart money will most likely be with them.
Whether a particular scheme of regulation actually promotes
equality and whether it impedes competition are difficult empirical
questions. The problem with the Court’s jurisprudence is that it forecloses empirical answers by eliminating equality as a value that can ever justify limits on campaign spending. This is the central flaw in the
Court’s campaign finance activism, from which the erroneous decision in Citizens United follows.
This point brings me back to the subject of election administration. Despite the Court’s longstanding recognition that the right to
vote is fundamental, and thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Roberts Court has been quite passive when it comes to laws
and practices that burden voting. Aside from Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), the Court has been insufficiently sensitive to the risk that incumbent officeholders may manipulate political rules to their own advantage. The leading example so far is the Court’s decision to uphold
Indiana’s strict voter identification law in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), despite the law’s tendency to impose a burden on voting by citizens of limited means.
Hayward plays the federalism card here, asserting that Article I,
Section 4 gives the states power to make election rules. That is certainly true; but again, this delegation of power only begins the inquiry,
since states’ election systems must comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has long held that voting is a fundamental right and, therefore, that infringements on this right—like
restrictions on most speech—warrant strict scrutiny. The difficult
question is identifying which burdens on voting trigger heightened
scrutiny, and what countervailing interest may justify those burdens.
In this area, the Court has virtually ignored Justice Scalia’s warning
about the first instinct of power.
To be clear, my point is not that the same constitutional rule should
apply in all election law contexts. The problems that arise in these two
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areas are not identical. But they are not apples and oranges, either.
Both election administration and campaign finance raise the question
of the proper role of the courts in the regulation of the political
process. It is not sufficient to answer that one involves speech and the
other elections. A better answer would look to whether political actors
can be trusted to balance the competing democratic values at stake and
to whether they have done so reliably, in particular circumstances. Unfortunately, this is not the approach that the Roberts Court has taken.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Is Egalitarianism Valuable?
Allison R. Hayward
I am sorry that this will be the last word in our Debate. Although I
would have liked to pin down Professor Tokaji a bit more successfully
on several of his key points, I will at least explain why I disagree with a
few of his arguments. In doing so, I will try to limit my discussion to
those parameters.
Professor Tokaji and I agree on the basics of current Supreme
Court doctrine regarding the role of judges in election law but disagree on whether that doctrine is coherent. I am wrong, he says, to separate campaign finance and election administration. Professor Tokaji
contends that courts should treat both domains similarly since both
“involve[] elections.” That is, proponents of campaign finance regulation are concerned in part about the effects of financial resources
on election results. But it cannot be the case that to determine the
scope of election administration, one should look at whether a potential target of regulation can affect election results. There is no logical
limit to such a classification. Anything and everything could potentially “affect” election results.
More fundamentally, I think Professor Tokaji and I simply disagree on what role the state should have in politics. He believes the
state has a proper and salutary role in both campaign finance and
election administration, whereas I see campaigns as requiring protection from state interference. Therefore, I think it is coherent to treat
campaign regulation differently from election regulation. A campaign involves a debate among the public, candidates, political parties, the press, and others about who should govern. The election is
the moment in which a subset of that group—the voters—makes a
choice. While it may be desirable to have a traffic cop patrol the conduct of the vote, the same cannot be said about a censor who mucks
up the debate leading to the vote.
Professor Tokaji also argues that both campaign finance regulation and election-administration regulation should further egalitarian
values. I disagree with this proposition because I fail to see how laws
can regulate campaign finance in a manner that serves “equality.” I
do, however, understand how elections can be administered in ways
that serve equality, and ultimately, democracy; regulators can set reasonable qualifications for voters, make registration and balloting accessible, and count the votes fairly.
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Professor Tokaji seems to believe that the sheer sums of money
spent in campaigns endanger elections. I am not sure if this notion is
correct. One reason for my skepticism is that, empirically, there are
just too many campaigns where the candidate that spends the most
money loses. See, e.g., Anne Bauer, Candidate Self-Financing: More Barrier Than Stepping Stone, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.
phtml?r=438 (identifying the 2010 California gubernatorial campaign
as an example). I have observed on one occasion that Meg Whitman,
who spent over $140 million of her own money and yet lost the 2010
California gubernatorial race, flies commercial now.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the “vast inequalities in financial
resources” that distort campaign spending endanger “democracy” or
“equality,” a federal ban on corporate expenditures does not solve
that problem. Many actors in society have wealth, but only some of
those actors are corporations. Moreover, only a small minority of corporations spend money on campaigns; in the world before Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), incorporated groups still had
other, less direct ways of participating in politics. For example, they
could communicate internally with executives, fund tax-exempt
groups, or run issue advertising. Thus, the corporate-expenditure ban
was both overbroad and underinclusive. Again, the holding in Citizens
United was clearly correct as an application of constitutional law, and I
do not see anything in Professor Tokaji’s reply to the contrary.
Why isn’t more campaign spending better? I observe that “wealthy” interests are actually quite heterogeneous. Thus, isn’t it a service
to democracy that private organizations want to battle it out among
themselves for voters’ favor? Put another way, the restrictions on
campaign spending seem to be inherently antidemocratic. I doubt
whether restrictions that silence speakers preserve any “value” in campaigns. Limits on speakers seem to make as much sense as imposing
earplugs (or blindfolds) on voters.

